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IDOLATRY AND FAITH: 
THE JURISPRUDENCE OF SANFORD LEVINSON 
Jack M. Balkin* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
It is a great pleasure to be able to honor Sandy Levinson, my very dear friend, who 
has done so many things for me in the course of my academic life.  He discovered me, 
when I was an assistant professor toiling in the vineyards at the University of Missouri-
Kansas City, and he and Scot Powe persuaded the members of the faculty at the 
University of Texas School of Law to bring me there, and give me a job, perhaps against 
their better judgment.  He was incredibly generous to me during my years there, and 
since then.  He took me under his wing, and I learned an enormous amount from him, so 
much so, that as I describe the themes of his work to you in this essay, it strikes me how 
much these same themes have also become central to my own work as well.  That is the 
depth and significance of his influence. 
Of the many things he has done for me in the course of my academic career, one of 
the most valuable is allowing me the opportunity to collaborate with him.  We have now 
written eleven articles, two books, and we are currently working on a third.  But the 
greatest treasure he has given me is the gift of his friendship, which surpasses all, and I 
am deeply honored to be able to tell you about the work of this wonderful man, who I 
respect and admire greatly, and who I feel privileged every day of my life to be able to 
work with. 
This essay is about the themes of Sandy’s work, and what they mean to me.  
Anyone who reads Sandy’s work knows that his interests are wide-ranging indeed.  He 
has written about a large number of different topics, including constitutional law, 
professional responsibility, political theory, law and religion, multiculturalism, the study 
of public monuments, jurisprudence, interpretive theory, law and literature, and law and 
music, just to name a few.  I cannot do justice to all of these themes in this essay.  
Rather, I will pick and choose among them, emphasizing the ones that have had the most 
influence on my own thought, and no doubt, I will end up articulating and embellishing 
them in ways that differ from the way Sandy would present them.  But that, of course, is 
both the bounty and the price of influence.  Influence means that what you think and say 
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gets thought and said by others, but not necessarily the same way you would say it or 
think it. 
Sandy is not a system builder in the Hegelian style.  He is less architect than 
explorer, continually trying out new ideas, and testing old ones.  He is at heart an 
essayist, happiest when he is offering analytical gems in a relatively few pages.  He looks 
at an area and sees tensions and comparisons that no one had seen before.  He asks other 
scholars: “If you are really committed to position A, then how do you explain your 
commitment to position B, and wouldn’t you also have to think C as well?”  Through the 
use of a dialectical method, he has been able to create an enormously rich set of 
problems and possibilities. 
Like Socrates, Sandy Levinson offers little in the way of dogma or doctrine, but he 
stimulates everyone around him to rethink their position.  This is, I think, one of the great 
sources of his influence.  Many of his articles have titles like “Reflections on X,” or 
“Thoughts about Y,” or even “Comments about Z.”1  Such modesty might lead one to 
believe that his work lacks an overarching set of themes.  But nothing could be further 
from the truth.  There is a passage in Emerson—one of Sandy’s favorite authors—in 
which Emerson compares a person to an Alexandrian sonnet.  Like the Alexandrian 
sonnet, it does not matter whether you read it forwards or backwards, the nature of a 
person’s true beliefs will shine through.2  And so it is with Sandy’s work, which, if 
carefully read, reveals a consistent set of themes and problems that have fascinated him 
throughout his long and influential career. 
II. ACTS OF FAITH 
The most central theme in Sandy’s work is faith.  That word appears, appropriately 
enough, in the title of his first and most well-known book, Constitutional Faith.3  Sandy 
is a self-described secular Jew, an agnostic who nevertheless maintains a kosher home.  
This is, I think, a remarkable fact.  After all, to keep kosher is a serious commitment, not 
only of one’s time and energy, but, perhaps more importantly, of one’s stomach.  Sandy 
does not obey the laws of kashrut out of faith in God; he is agnostic about God’s 
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existence.  He does so because he is deeply devoted to his Judaism.  The tension or the 
frisson between being agnostic about God, and nevertheless making the very 
considerable commitment to keeping kosher is a useful way of understanding what 
Sandy is about, and why faith is the central theme of his work. 
Despite his agnosticism, Sandy remains a religious thinker.  I think it is fair to say 
that Judaism inflects and influences all of Sandy’s academic work.  Not all aspects of 
Judaism, of course, for belief in one God is, after all, the central tenet of the Jewish 
religion.  Rather, I identify Sandy particularly with that part of the Jewish tradition that is 
dialectical, devoted to conversation and intellectual exchange, focuses on the problems 
of interpretation and knowing truth, avoids closure, and is, on occasion, dizzyingly self-
reflexive and even self-undermining.  These are all parts of the Jewish tradition, even if 
they are surely not the whole; one can find them in the commentatorial tradition of the 
Talmud and the Midrash.4  They are all reflected in Sandy’s approach. 
Faith, of course, has many different aspects, and one can have faith in many 
different sorts of things: besides faith in God, one can also have faith in the law, faith in 
the Constitution, faith in the nation, or faith in the American people.  For Sandy, faith is 
valuable and even desirable, but it is, at the same time, something fraught and deeply 
complicated.  This dual attitude toward faith—his embrace of the value of faith and his 
critical attitude toward faith—is a central element of Sandy’s work.  Faith is always 
weighted by consequence, not only by the demands of the present but by the memory of 
the past and what has been done in the name of faith, whether it be faith in a particular 
religion, faith in the Rule of Law, or faith in the Constitution.  Faith is not something that 
one simply has.  It is something that one is immersed in, involved in, embedded in, 
responsible for. Faith is not simple or easy.  It is something that one must think about, 
and worry about, and talk about, and discuss.  Faith is the occasion for conversation and 
reflection, not the end of conversation and reflection.  Faith does not substitute for or 
displace reason.  It is both the nourishing spring and the critical object of reason. 
Having faith is only the beginning of the inquiry.  What exactly is it that you 
believe in?  What is the ground of your faith?  What justifies your faith?  How do you 
know that you have faith?  How do you show that you have faith?  The demonstration of 
faith may be deeply tied to the possession of faith; often one acts to demonstrate that one 
believes, and in so acting, one confirms one’s beliefs, both to others, and more 
importantly to one’s self.  Conversely, if one cannot demonstrate belief through action, 
the question remains whether one’s faith is real or feigned, whether it is a genuine 
commitment or a set of beliefs retained out of inertia or convenience. 
The key moment in Constitutional Faith occurs near the end of the book, when 
Sandy visits an exhibit sponsored by the National Park Service in Philadelphia during the 
Constitution’s Bicentennial.5  The exhibit invites people to add their names to the 
Constitution, and Sandy debates whether or not to sign the Constitution himself.  Here is 
the issue of faith, crystallized in a single act, a single situation, asking him whether he is 
committed or not committed.  But of course, it is not as simple as that.  Signing the 
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document in 1988 is hardly the same thing as signing it in 1787, or even, for that matter, 
1861, as the Union is dissolving into civil war.  Moreover, both the signing and the 
refusal to sign might involve a commitment, just different types of commitment.  Indeed, 
to refuse publicly to sign the Constitution—in the face of the self-congratulatory 
celebration of the Constitution’s bicentennial—may be a more stringent or daring 
statement of commitment.  Both the signing and the refusing to sign are acts of faith, but 
faith in different things.  Both are also, interestingly, acts that might indicate lack of 
faith, but once again in different ways.  Refusing to sign clearly suggests lack of faith in 
the constitutional enterprise.  But signing might also indicate lack of faith that the 
country could survive without the compromises made in 1787. 
It is not surprising, then, that oaths play a prominent role in Sandy’s work.6  
Taking an oath—especially in public, before an audience—is a time honored method of 
demonstrating one’s commitments, both to others, and, equally importantly, to one’s self.  
But Sandy is equally concerned with the puzzling character of oathtaking.  To swear to 
defend the Constitution of the United States may not, he points out, necessarily commit a 
person to any particular substantive set of beliefs.7  It may not bind a person to behave in 
ways that people who insist on the oath might like.  Presidents take an oath to obey the 
Constitution, but this may not constrain their actions, at least from the perspective of 
outside observers.  Abraham Lincoln swore an oath to protect and defend the 
Constitution of the United States, as did Richard Nixon, but to this day many people still 
debate whether Lincoln’s acts as President were consistent with the Constitution, and 
most people agree that several of Nixon’s actions subverted the constitutional system.  
Conversely, refusing to take an oath, particularly when it is done in public, may 
crystallize a person’s beliefs.  Equally importantly, it strongly signals to outside 
observers what that person’s views might be, perhaps even more strongly than the 
perfunctory or desultory swearing of oaths that many individuals engage in when they 
apply for licenses or other government benefits. 
One of Sandy’s favorite cases, United States v. Schneiderman,8 exemplifies the 
puzzles of public oaths and oathtaking.  Schneiderman concerns whether a committed 
Communist can swear an oath to uphold the Constitution of the United States.  The 
answer to that question, in turn, depends on a further set of questions about what it 
means to be committed to the Constitution, and ultimately, about what the Constitution 
is.  Schneiderman, the Court ultimately held, could swear to uphold the Constitution 
even though he believed in the necessity of communism sweeping the globe, because, 
presumably, he could imagine the Constitution being peacefully altered or amended to 
enforce communist principles.9  Yet such a Constitution would be very different from the 
one we now possess. 
Schneiderman is a difficult case because of the connections between faith and 
commitment.  Normally, faith in something commits us to a view about the nature of 
what we have faith in, either what the object of faith is, or, in some versions of theology, 
 
 6. Id. at 90-121. 
 7. Id. at 123-26. 
 8. 320 U.S. 118 (1943). 
 9. Levinson supra n. 3, at 137; Schneiderman, 320 U.S. at 137-38. 
    
 IDOLATRY AND FAITH 105 
what the object of faith is not.  In some religious traditions, for example, to have faith in 
God is to believe something about God; that He made Heaven and Earth, that He is good, 
that He is omnipotent, that He has or desires to have a relationship with us, and so on.  
Yet if Schneiderman and a member of the John Birch Society could both swear an oath 
to protect and defend the Constitution, it is unclear what commitment to the Constitution 
really means.  It is sort of like the joke about the politician who tried unsuccessfully to 
soothe religious tensions by reminding the audience that “It doesn’t matter whether you 
are a Christian or a Jew, an agnostic or an atheist.  Despite our differences, we all 
worship the same God.” 
By the end of Constitutional Faith, Sandy suggests that commitment to the 
Constitution is commitment to an open and continuing dialogue about what democratic 
self-government means.10  But at the same time, he acknowledges that this cannot be the 
whole story, for commitment to conversation and dialogue only begs the question: 
Dialogue on whose terms?  No one would confuse the institutions of the United States 
Constitution with a Habermasian ideal speech situation.  If the grounds of dialogue and 
participation are skewed in important ways—for example, if the rules of dialogue and the 
processes of self-governance are tilted toward the protection of the rich and the 
powerful—the Constitution may never become what Sandy hopes it will someday be. 
III. THE DANGERS OF LEGAL FAITH: THEODICY 
For Sandy, then, faith is the central jurisprudential question, linked to many central 
questions in law as well as in theology.  Yet faith is not a simple matter; it is convoluted 
and perplexing, tangled and fraught.  Faith is something desperately to be sought for and 
simultaneously something to be feared.  Why is faith something to be feared?  Because 
faith, although marvelous and beneficent, also holds hidden dangers. 
The dangers of faith do not arise from the inevitable doubts that lead people to 
agnosticism or atheism, for those doubts lead people away from faith, not toward it.  
They arise because even the faithful, even the person who believes in God fervently and 
devotedly, knows that the works of religion, the products of religion, the practices and 
conventions of religion, are made by mortal human beings, by communities of belief that 
extend and evolve over time, sometimes over many centuries.  They are not God’s own 
creation; they are created by human beings in order to know and honor God.  They are 
human representations of God’s word; human attempts to know God and understand His 
ways.  Because the practices and conventions of faith are the creations of mortal human 
beings, there is always the possibility of separation, distancing, or falling away from 
God.  The conventions may be mistaken, the dogmas may become hardened and 
inflexible, the church and its leaders may become impious and corrupted.  So even the 
most devoted face the dangers inherent in faith, and they face them not because they are 
agnostic but precisely because they have given their lives over to faith. 
What are the dangers of faith?  They are apology or theodicy on the one hand, and 
idolatry on the other.  Theodicy is the more neutral term; apology is the more pejorative 
term.  Apology is the delusion, conveyed to others, that what one believes in and is 
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committed to is good or righteous, or, in the fullness of time, will be revealed as good 
and righteous or become so.  One apologizes for evil and injustice to make it appear 
acceptable and justified.  Theodicy, of course, is the attempt to explain the existence of 
evil in a world with a good and omnipotent God. 
From the standpoint of law, the question is whether belief in the Rule of Law (or, 
somewhat differently, in the Constitution) is what E.P. Thompson called “an unqualified 
human good,”11 or whether such faith might ultimately be a form of apology for the 
kinds of oppression and injustice that are wrought through the forms and practices, the 
technical arguments and devices of law and lawyering.  Law can be a concretization of 
great human ideals, a realization of deep human aspirations.  But it can also be a means 
through which the strong oppress the weak, and the unjust take advantage of the just.  
The problem is that law is both of these things at one and the same time. 
When one believes in or has faith in the Rule of Law, or the United States 
Constitution, what exactly is it that one believes in?  What exactly is it that one has faith 
in?  One possibility is that one believes that the legal system, or the Constitution, are in 
fact just, or at least acceptably so.  The theological analogy is belief that the world is in 
fact just.  The belief that the world is just is hard to maintain in the face of the many evils 
in the world, and this fact gives rise to the need for theodicy.  In like fashion, belief that 
the legal system is just is undermined when one comes face to face with the forms of 
injustice and wickedness practiced through human law.  In theology, one can argue that 
the gift of free will makes the world better than it would be otherwise.  Or one can argue 
that the path of human development is fated toward progress, or points inevitably toward 
a central event, like the coming of the Messiah or the Second Coming of Jesus, after 
which all will be properly resolved and an era of peace will reign. 
There are analogous moves available with respect to law.  One can justify one’s 
faith in law, or in the Constitution, through a narrative of progress.  Even though 
injustice and oppression are everywhere and have still not been wiped out, even though 
law and the forms of law are still abused and misused, both cynically and 
sanctimoniously, ultimately our faith, our commitment to the Rule of Law (or to the 
United States Constitution), will pay off.  Past injustices will be rectified in the future; 
oppression through law in the present will give way to better, fairer practices in days yet 
to come.  One’s belief and faith in law, and in the Constitution, will ultimately be 
vindicated, and so it will have been worth it all along to have believed, to have had faith. 
The philosophical theory called positivism denies that law must necessarily be just 
in order to be law.  It is premised on the possibility of unjust laws.  But positivism does 
not deny that law can be just, or be made just.  So a positivist could have faith in a 
narrative of legal progress.  Indeed, it is likely that many positivists have faith that law 
can and will become better, in part through the very forms of critique that positivism 
makes available.  They believe that commitment to the political ideal of the Rule of Law 
will, in time, have a salutary effect that will justify or vindicate their faith in law, even 
though they acknowledge that many legal systems around the world are not particularly 
just. 
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I have been speaking of faith both in the Constitution and in the Rule of Law, but 
the two are of course distinct, and the grounds of faith in the two are also distinct, or may 
become distinct.  It is surely possible to have faith in the Constitution, but not in the Rule 
of Law, depending on how thick or thin one’s conception of the Rule of Law is.  A thin 
conception would require only that such rules as exist be applied fairly and impartially to 
all, regardless of wealth or social status.  A thicker conception might demand certain 
procedures for law to be created and applied, and a still thicker conception would begin 
to import some of the requirements of democracy and human rights that we find 
articulated in the United States Constitution.  Faith in a very thin conception might not 
justify faith in eventual improvement; for laws can still be quite unjust even if they are 
applied impartially.  And even in thicker conceptions, there is always more to justice 
than adherence to the Rule of Law. 
Even if one does not put one’s faith in the Rule of Law, however, one might still 
have faith that the particular set of legal institutions called the American Constitution are 
destined to work themselves pure over time.  The evidence for this faith would be the 
fact that a country founded by rich white males, many of whom owned slaves and 
believed in natural hierarchies of race, class, and sex, eventually gave way to a more 
democratic nation that welcomed working men, blacks, and women to full and equal 
citizenship, and eventually secured basic rights and privileges after years of struggle.  
This familiar story of America and its Constitution I call the Great Progressive 
Narrative.12  The Great Progressive Narrative, while not denying the inequities of the 
past, explains how we have gradually worked ourselves free of them: America has gotten 
freer, more equal, and more just, and it is still on that righteous path.  It is yet to become 
what it will someday be.  As Langston Hughes put it, with equal measures of accusation 
and hope, “America never was America to me, And yet I swear this oath—America will 
be!”13  America, the Great Progressive Narrative tells us, is still in a state of becoming—
it is still on the road to becoming America.  And the American Constitution is a central 
document in that redemption.  The Great Progressive Narrative is a theodicy that seeks to 
explain and excuse our past injustices: it is a narrative of faith in human progress 
organized around Americans’ love of their Constitution and the principles that it 
embodies. 
When one has faith in the Constitution in this way, one also has faith in the 
American nation, in the American people, as a people who will, through strife and 
struggle, eventually listen to what Abraham Lincoln called “the better angels of our 
nature,”14 and eventually make progress toward justice.  That point is important, for 
belief in the Rule of Law is often opposed to belief in the Rule of Persons.  But faith in 
the Constitution may well be faith, not simply in law, but in the ultimate goodness of a 
nation, or of a people. 
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For Sandy, these issues are crystallized in a simple question: Is the Constitution a 
comedy or a tragedy?15  If the Constitution is a comedy, then like a comedy it has a 
happy ending.  Justice is served, either now or in the future.  Often when Sandy asks this 
question, he means to ask it about the present: Does the best interpretation of the 
Constitution lead to a just result in the present?16  But I think one can ask the same 
question about the progress of the Constitution over time.  One can ask whether, in the 
long run, the development of the Constitution will lead us to a better, more just society, 
even though the Constitution currently permits and even requires some very serious 
injustices.  If the Constitution is a comedy, then eventually our faith in the Constitution, 
and its development through democratic processes, will have paid off.  And because our 
faith will have paid off, it made sense to have had faith all along.  It was worth it for 
those at the bottom to suffer the injustices and indignities of the past because of the 
payoff at the end.  If, on the other hand, the Constitution is a tragedy, we should not be 
surprised that adherence to the Constitution leads to injustice and oppression, nor should 
we be surprised that our grand national experiment in self-governance leads to tyranny, 
violence, or dissolution.  If the Constitution is a tragedy, then we were engaged in 
apology when we downplayed its shortcomings.  This was a theodicy we never should 
have engaged in. 
A key figure in Sandy’s work is William Lloyd Garrison, the militant abolitionist, 
who argued that protection of slavery in the 1787 Constitution was its fatal flaw.  He 
argued that the Constitution was a “covenant with death, and an agreement with hell,”17 
and that whether or not the South wanted to secede from the North, the North should 
secede from the South, for there should be no union with slaveholders.  Even after 
slavery has been abolished, Garrison’s accusation still haunts us today.  Is the 
Constitution still, in some ways, a compromise with injustice, a pact with death, an 
agreement with hell? 
Garrison’s accusation brings home the connection between faith in the Constitution 
and the problem of theodicy or apology.  Imagine once again the moment when the 
Framers sign the Constitution in Philadelphia, or the moment, two hundred years later, 
when Sandy stands in the museum in the same city, deciding whether to sign the 
Constitution or not.  To sign the Constitution is to say to one’s self, and to others: “It will 
work out, I believe it.  Even though slavery is protected by the 1787 Constitution, and 
even though the Constitution as we know it today contains many injustices, I believe that 
the story of the Constitution is a comedy, not a tragedy.  I believe that things will turn 
out for the best.  I believe that the justice of the Constitutional system will be unveiled 
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through history, and I am committed to working for its eventual vindication.”  Garrison 
clearly would not have signed.  He believed that the Constitution was not just a tragedy 
in the long run; he believed that it was a tragedy in his own time.18 
IV. THE DANGERS OF LEGAL FAITH: IDOLATRY 
The first danger of faith is the danger of apology or theodicy.  The second danger 
of faith is the danger of idolatry.  What is idolatry?  Idolatry is the belief in a false god, 
in a graven image, in a false representation that purports to be the image of God but is 
not.  The Second Commandment says that one must not worship a graven image.  It is a 
central tenet of Judaism.  Indeed, we might define Judaism as the religion that believes 
that one should never bow down before idols. 
Sandy’s jurisprudence is Judaic in this sense, for he believes, as I do, that one 
should never bow down before a graven image, either in one’s religious practices, or in 
the law.  And when one discovers idolatry, whether in the world or in the law, it is one’s 
moral duty to denounce it. 
What are the idols that exist in the world of law and in the world of the 
Constitution?  There is the idolatry of the Rule of Law itself when viewed as a substitute 
for justice, the idolatry of legal reason as a solution to all moral and social problems, the 
idolatry of mathematical precision in legal reasoning, the idolatry of chauvinism, and the 
idolatry of degraded and unreasoning forms of patriotism and nationalism (as opposed to 
healthier versions). 
Sandy’s work is constituted by a fundamental ambivalence.  He is opposed to 
idolatry, and yet he has sympathy and fascination with the signs and symbols of 
patriotism, nationhood, and law, including national monuments, and, particularly, flags.  
Anyone who knows Sandy knows how much he loves the American flag, and knows that 
he collects all sorts of different representations and uses of the flag, patriotic and critical, 
artistic and commercial.  His collection of flags and representations of the flag symbolize 
the ambivalence that is inherent in his work, his love of the flag, the country, the nation, 
the people, and the Constitution, his admiration for how the flag can serve as a symbol of 
freedom, dissent and critique, and, at the same time, an almost anthropological 
fascination with how the flag has been used by people in ways that shock and horrify 
him.  One of the most riveting examples in his large and impressive collection is a 
picture from a Nazi rally in 1939 held in New Jersey; the leader gives the Nazi salute in 
front of a display containing the American flag, the swastika, and Gilbert Stuart’s portrait 
of George Washington.  The combination of the flag as the symbol of American 
freedom, the iconic representation of Washington, the father of the nation, and the 
invocation of a deadly philosophy create fascination and horror in anyone who sees the 
picture. 
 
 18. Moreover, to say that the Constitution is a comedy, of course, is not to say that the path of progress will 
be smooth.  Given the blood and struggle necessary to achieve justice, one may well wonder whether the game 
is worth the candle.  And even if the Constitution becomes just over time, what comfort does this provide for 
those who suffer injustice and indignity in the present, before the moment of its redemption?  Their 
mistreatment may never be fully recognized or rectified.  If the Constitution is a comedy, it may be a very dark 
comedy indeed. 
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Sandy and his wife Cynthia have lent a very large collection of pictures and 
representations of flags to the University of Texas School of Law, which are on public 
display in various areas of the law school.  That collection, and its display in a school of 
law—devoted, as the entrance to the school tells us, to equal justice under law—cannot 
be understood on a simple level.  The collection, and its placement in the law school, are 
both a celebration of American patriotism and a sly critique, both an advertisement of the 
law and a rebuke to the law.  The pictures and works of art make conflicting statements, 
sometimes heartwarming, sometimes amusing, sometimes disturbing.  That mixture, that 
ambivalence, that conflict, that frisson, is what Sandy’s work is about.  Through that 
conflict, that ambivalence, he hopes to expose the idolatry of others and avoid his own 
forms. 
In a monotheistic religion like Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, one believes in 
God, and yet one knows that there are idols, graven images, false representations of the 
Divine.  One adheres to words of the prophets and yet knows that there are false 
prophets.  How do we tell the difference between the true image and the false, between 
the Word of God and the graven image?  In some traditions, like Islam and Judaism, one 
avoids representations of the Divine altogether out of the fear of idolatry.  Yet even if 
God himself is not pictured or represented, his teachings are.  They must be, for religion 
to continue.  The representation of the Word of God, the Will of God, the promise of the 
Divine remains, even if pictorial representations are banished.  One must still ask how 
one tells the difference between the true representation of God’s will and the false, the 
true connection to divine intelligence and the spurious.  This is the problem of idolatry 
that remains after all the statutes have been smashed and all the pictorial representations 
of the Divine removed. 
The problem is that one cannot always know the difference between the true and 
the false, the divine and the idolatrous.  The idol does not tell you that it is only an idol 
of a nonexistent deity; the graven image does not tell you that it is merely a graven 
image.  The false dogma does not reveal itself as false; the false prophet does not 
disclose his or her deception.  All of them insist that they are true, and that you should 
believe in them, whether they are true or not.  That is the danger, the problem of idolatry.  
It is a problem of faith.  One must make a leap of faith in deciding what to believe and 
whom to believe, what customs to embrace, what institutions to follow. 
The same problem occurs when we shift our attention from the Word of God to the 
law.  Is our faith in law (or the Constitution) justified or misplaced, leading us to a 
certain form of idolatry?  That is one reason why Sandy’s work has long been concerned 
with the institution of chattel slavery, its importance in the formation of the American 
nation, and its effects on the development of the American Constitution.  The 
constitutional law casebook that we edit with Paul Brest and Akhil Amar has long 
devoted more pages than any other to the constitutional problems of slavery.  
Antebellum America, and the antebellum Constitution that governed it, are the most 
powerful examples of a period in which—at least from our standpoint—Americans were 
engaged in idolatry, in the worship of a graven image.  Americans worshiped law, 
freedom and democracy, but did so in a way that supported and justified great evils.  It 
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was a use of law, aggressively defended by its supporters in the name of private property, 
free enterprise, liberty, and democracy, that made a mockery of these concepts. 
In contemporary America, we condemn this idolatry.  We set ourselves against it.  
We define it as not us, not who we are.  But we do not wholly succeed.  For its effects 
are still with us.  It is our birthright.  It was placed at the foundation of our legal system, 
and even though the cornerstones have been removed, the impressions they leave still 
remain in the bones, the architecture of our Constitutional system, in the most 
unexpected ways: in the way we define what equality is, in the compromises between 
federal and state power that made the Constitution possible, even in the way that we elect 
our president through the use of an Electoral College.  We have smashed the idols.  We 
have cast them from the temple.  And yet the spaces that the idols occupied are still 
there; the architectural decisions made to accommodate them still live with us today.  A 
religion that smashes idols not only must fear that the idols will return, it must also live 
with the emptiness the idols leave in their stead, with their memory, with their remnants 
in the architecture of practice and belief.  It is true of Judaism.  It is true of Christianity 
and Islam.  It is true, I would argue, also of law. 
Yet law’s encounter with slavery is not just a story of bad men doing bad things 
and disguising them under the forms and practices of law.  Even during the antebellum 
period, the Rule of Law and the Constitution also served as a form of constraint—as a 
means of keeping the social and political order of the country together, as a means of 
dealing with difficult and terrible times.  Even (or perhaps especially) in the antebellum 
Constitution, the Constitution of compromise, the Constitution of slaveholders, we can 
find utopian ideals. 
One rarely faces the simple question whether to bow down to the idol that one 
knows to be an idol.  One is never asked whether one should adhere to a false 
representation of the Divine Word, knowing it to be false.  The idol never shows itself to 
us in that way, and the question of faith is never presented in so easy, or so stark a 
fashion.  It is always more complicated than that.  It is always uncertain what one has 
faith in.  It is always uncertain whether one’s faith will ultimately be vindicated. 
Sandy’s interest in presidential power and in what presidents do in the name of the 
Constitution is connected, I think, to his interest in the question of idolatry.  His two 
favorite examples are Lincoln and Nixon, because of what both did in claiming to act on 
behalf of the Constitution, on behalf of the nation.  Sandy is fascinated with Lincoln 
because Lincoln is the president who preserves the Union by denying civil liberties and 
by freeing the slaves.  Both of these acts could be seen as violating the Constitution.19  In 
both cases, we might ask whether the suspension of habeas corpus, or the freeing of the 
slaves, is an act of faith in the nation, in the Constitution, in the Rule of Law, or whether 
it is a breach of that faith.  History has elevated Lincoln to general regard as one of our 
greatest presidents.  However, in Constitutional Faith, Sandy quotes a dialogue between 
David Frost and Nixon, in which Nixon defends his policies during the Watergate 
scandal in Lincolnian terms, arguing that if the President believes that his actions are 
 
 19. Justice Curtis argued at length that the Emancipation Proclamation was beyond the President’s powers 
to conduct war and put down rebellion.  Brest, Levinson, Balkin & Amar, supra n. 15, at 226-28. 
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necessary for the defense of the country, they are legal.20  When the president acts to 
save the country, he is not acting above the law.  But of course, it’s Nixon speaking, not 
Lincoln.  When the words come out of Nixon’s mouth, they seem far more troubling.  
After all, Abraham Lincoln is on the penny and the five dollar bill, and I don’t think that 
Nixon ever will be.  Juxtaposing Lincoln and Nixon, one might well ask, how do you 
tell, at the time of decision, at the moment of choice, which is the idol, and which is the 
true representation of God’s word? 
The dangers of apology and idolatry lead Sandy to a hermeneutics of suspicion in 
law, directed against the products of law, the claims of law, and the professional 
judgments of well-trained lawyers, schooled in the legal common sense of a particular 
historical period.  The well-trained lawyer, devoted to the forms and practices of law, 
and professing a proud faith in both the Constitution and the Rule of Law, might 
nevertheless use the forms and devices, the rhetorics and mechanisms of law to 
perpetrate great injustices.  The fact that lawyers are well-trained does not prevent these 
injustices.  Instead, the injustices occur through the forms and devices, rhetorics and 
mechanisms of law.  They are defended in the name of the Rule of Law, and those who 
dare speak against them are often accused of setting themselves against the Rule of Law, 
and, by definition, against civilization.  Here again slavery is an apt example.  The 
institution of slavery was supported and defended by the ablest legal minds of their time, 
who justified it as a sovereign right of states and as a sacred form of private property, 
and who drew upon their considerable talents to protect it, maintain it, and even expand 
it.  If well-trained lawyers could have done this on behalf of slavery, what does this say 
about what equally well-trained lawyers might be doing today? 
V. LAWYERS, PRIESTS, AND RHETORS 
If we compare law to religion, who are the priests?  The priests of law, one 
assumes, are lawyers and judges.  If so, we might ask whether it is necessary to have 
faith in law, or in the system of legal authority, in order to be a good lawyer or a good 
judge.  Moreover, we might ask whether a professor of law must profess faith in law in 
the same way that we might expect a professor in a divinity school or a school of 
theology to be a believer devoted to promoting the faith and to training new clerics 
similarly imbued.  In Constitutional Faith, Sandy asks whether the law school is best 
compared to a department of theology or a department of religion.  The purpose of the 
former is to teach the truths of religion; the purpose of the latter is to search for truths 
about religion.  A professor in a religious studies department does not have to believe in 
a particular religion.  Some members of the faculty might even be atheists or agnostics, 
because to be a member of a religion department one might only be interested in religion 
from an anthropological, sociological, historical, or economic standpoint.  By contrast, a 
 
 20. Levinson, supra n. 3, at 133 n. *.  Sandy points out that Lincoln, unlike Nixon, added the proviso that if 
the people do not agree with the President’s decisions, they can vote him out of office.  Id. at 133.  But he adds 
that the difference may not be so great: if Nixon had persuaded the public that his actions were necessary, 
history might well have treated him more kindly.  Hence “it is necessary to ask whether Nixon’s offense was 
his disobedience to law, or his patent failure to persuade the public that his violations of law were truly 
required to protect ‘national security.’”  Id. at 133-34. 
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department of theology would presumably restrict its membership to those who 
genuinely believe.21  If law professors train lawyers, who will represent clients, does this 
mean that law professors have to have faith in law?  Or does it mean only that they have 
to be skilled in teaching their students what they need to know to be effective adversaries 
and represent their clients effectively in the existing legal system? 
This last question suggests that there might be an important distinction between 
lawyers and priests.  Lawyers are rhetors who manipulate and wield rhetoric in order to 
persuade others and to promote the interests of their clients. Priests, on the other hand, 
are expected to believe in what they say to those they lead and to those they seek to 
convert.  Yet on closer inspection, the distinction between lawyers and priests is not as 
great as might be supposed.  There is, after all, a long tradition of preaching and of the 
study of preaching in the history of religion.  The purpose of preaching is to persuade, 
convince, move, impel, and convert the audience, bringing them closer, one hopes, 
toward goodness, toward faith, toward God.  But the same techniques that one studies in 
learning how to move the audience emotionally and bring them closer to what is good 
are the same tools that might be used to move the audience toward perfidy, and 
encourage them to do all sorts of terrible things.  Both the cause of abolition and the 
defense of slavery were preached from pulpits in antebellum America, and the history of 
religion is strewn with examples of false prophets and demagogues who exhorted their 
flocks to intolerance, injustice, and violence, all in God’s name.  In this sense, the 
problem of the lawyer as rhetor is also a problem for the preacher.  The rhetorical skills 
of both the lawyer and the preacher might lead others to idolatry and apology. 
To be sure, the problem seems particularly urgent in the case of lawyers.  After all, 
lawyers are hired to say things they don’t necessarily believe.  They may in fact believe 
them, or come to believe them through repeated argument, but they don’t have to believe 
them as long as what they say benefits their clients.  Saying things they don’t believe, 
massaging the facts, stretching the truth, offering contrary perspectives, sowing doubt, 
and proliferating confusion is what lawyers do for a living.  One can certainly offer 
reasons why lawyers’ role as rhetors is entirely consistent with the Rule of Law and 
actually promotes the justice of the legal system in the long run.  The adversary system, 
one might point out, is the best device for weighing competing claims, working out the 
practical meaning of abstract legal principles, and settling disputes.  In this way, lawyers’ 
role as wielders of rhetoric lets the law work itself pure and helps the law perform its 
function of avoiding violence and securing peace.  That is how one might reconcile the 
vision of the lawyer as rhetor with one’s faith that the Rule of Law (or the Constitution) 
will be a comedy and not a tragedy; that one’s faith in law, or the Constitution, 
ultimately will be vindicated.  One can certainly argue in this fashion, but it takes 
considerable effort, for the claim is not obvious on its face.  It takes—dare one say it—
some degree of faith: faith in lawyers and in the system of legal argument and legal 
contestation. 
If lawyers are rhetors who sometimes say things they do not believe, are there no 
constraints on the practice of legal argument?  Or do some forms of rhetoric breach the 
 
 21. See Levinson, supra n. 3, at 157-161. 
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faith that lawyers owe the system of law?  This brings us to problem of frivolous legal 
argument, which is, not coincidentally, the subject of Sandy’s essay, Frivolous Cases, 
subtitled, Do Lawyers Really Know Anything at All?22  Sandy’s fascination with 
frivolous legal argument is itself hardly frivolous.  It is connected to many of the themes 
outlined above: the lawyer as rhetor who is nevertheless a key player in maintaining a 
system of faith in the Rule of Law, the relationship between the Rule of Law and justice, 
and the question whether the story of law (or the Constitution) is ultimately a comedy or 
a tragedy. 
Frivolous legal argument marks a liminal point in a system of law premised on 
faith in the Rule of Law and its ultimate vindication.  If no legal arguments can be 
dismissed as frivolous, then law cannot constrain arbitrary power, and all manner of evils 
may be done in its name.  Hence, the boundary that separates the frivolous from the 
nonfrivolous must be preserved in order to preserve the possibility of faith in law.  
Because of its importance in sustaining faith in the Rule of Law, the boundary between 
the frivolous and the serious must be guarded, and guarded jealously.  It follows that the 
lawyer who makes a frivolous legal argument has done more than make a mistake; he or 
she has breached a crucial boundary that undergirds the system of legal faith and faith in 
the legal system.  But the problem is that sometimes it is very hard to tell what the 
boundaries of frivolous legal argument and nonfrivolous legal argument are, or as I like 
to put it, what is “off the wall” and what is “on the wall.” 
The practice of legal argument, and perhaps equally important, the practice of 
politics, can shift the boundaries of what is on the wall and off the wall.  The boundary 
that demarcates the frivolous from the plausible but wrong can be moved, and it is and 
has been continuously in motion.  It is moved through repeated assertion and argument 
by well-trained lawyers in legal cases, and it is moved through assertion and protest in 
politics.  There is perhaps no better example of this than the famous case of Bush v. 
Gore.23  Prior to November 7, 2000, the legal arguments made by the Bush forces 
concerning the meaning of Article II, Section 1, and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal 
Protection Clause would have been regarded by most lawyers and judges as off the 
wall.24  But within a short space of time, a number of very important and influential 
people got behind these arguments, including Theodore Olsen, a seasoned Supreme 
Court litigator who is now Solicitor General of the United States, and a respectable 
number of conservative legal thinkers, including at least two members of the Harvard 
Law faculty.25  Perhaps most importantly, several members of the United States 
Supreme Court thought that these arguments were not only plausible but convincing. 
 
 22. Sanford Levinson, Frivolous Cases: Do Lawyers Really Know Anything at All?, 24  Osgoode Hall L.J. 
353 (1986). 
 23. 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (“Bush II”). 
 24. See Michael J. Klarman, Bush v. Gore Through the Lens of Constitutional History, 89 Cal. L. Rev. 
1721, 1731 n. 45, 1730-31, 1736-37 (2001). 
 25. See Einer Elhauge, Bush v. Florida, N.Y. Times A27 (Nov. 20, 2000) (arguing that manual counts had 
no objective and clear standards, thus anticipating the equal protection argument made in Bush v. Gore); 
Chalres Fried, “A Badly Flawed Election,”: An Exchange, N.Y. Rev. Books (Feb. 20, 2001) (defending the 
result on Article II, Section 1 grounds). 
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In law, authority matters a great deal in determining plausibility, and the 
plausibility of a legal argument is often shaped by powerful and influential people who 
are willing to stand up and stake their reputations as reasonable people on making the 
argument or defending it.  In this way, authority reshapes the boundaries of the plausible 
and the implausible.26  After Bush v. Gore, for example, arguments that were once off 
the wall are off the wall no longer.  Some of them, in fact, are the law of the land. 
Obviously, this has implications for the problem of legal faith.  The boundary that 
separates the plausible from the implausible, the off the wall from the on the wall, is the 
boundary that helps preserve faith in the law and the legal system.  It is the boundary that 
distinguishes the Rule of Law from the arbitrary exercise of power.  But if that boundary 
is not fixed, but moveable, and if that boundary can be moved through politics, or 
through the assertions of powerful people who seek to maintain their power, the certainty 
of our faith in law might well be shaken.  If the rich and the mighty can increase their 
power by turning bad legal arguments into good ones through the force of their 
influence, what is the point of belief in law as a constraint on power?  It would be as if 
the church modified its doctrines to benefit the rich and altered its understanding of 
Divine revelation to accommodate the interests of powerful.  This, indeed, has probably 
happened more than once in the history of religion, but that fact hardly excuses the 
practice.  Indeed, it shakes our faith all the more. 
It would perhaps be simpler if the boundaries of the plausible and implausible were 
truly fixed, subject only to depredations by the powerful.  Then one could simply 
criticize the powerful for disturbing the purity of law and undermining legal faith.  But 
the problem is larger than this.  The law is a historical product, shaped through evolving 
conventions.  No transhistorical set of criteria defines what is on the wall and what is off 
the wall in legal argument.  At any point in time, some arguments are clearly frivolous, 
but the class of such arguments keeps changing, and it changes in part through the very 
activity of making arguments that skirt the boundaries of the implausible and off the 
wall. 
Knowledge of history and of historical change challenge the simplest forms of 
faith in law, just as they challenge the simplest forms of religious faith.  To be a Jew 
today is not to believe in or to practice the same exact things Jews believed and did in the 
past.  The destruction of the Second Temple, and the Diaspora that followed it, set in 
motion events that fundamentally and profoundly changed Jewish identity and Jewish 
faith.  So, too, did modernity and the Enlightenment, and so, too, did the Second World 
War, the Holocaust, and the creation of the State of Israel.  To be a Jew means 
maintaining connection to that changing tradition.  It means being able to have faith 
despite the fact of these changes, or more correctly, to have faith through the fact of 
these changes.  But such a cosmopolitan, historicist attitude creates great dangers if one 
is also committed to avoiding idolatry.  For if the Word of God is not fixed, but 
continually changes, if the meaning of Divine Revelation is made in history, and altered 
by moral human beings, how do we tell the false prophets from the true ones?  How do 
 
 26. See Jack M. Balkin, Bush v. Gore and the Boundary Between Law and Politics, 110 Yale L.J. 1407 
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we tell the genuine representation of Divine law from idolatry?  Or to put the problem 
another way, if the history of the Jewish people were different, and the political pressures 
put upon them were different, would the content of the Torah and of Jewish law also be 
different?  And if they would be different, would they equally be the Word of God?  Can 
religious faith, or legal faith for that matter, survive the acknowledgment of change, of 
politics, of contingency? 
VI. LAW AS PERFORMANCE 
Another way to consider the relationship between lawyers, judges, and faith in the 
Rule of Law, or in the Constitution, is through the lens of performance.  Sandy and I 
have argued that a fruitful way to think about law is through an analogy to the 
performing arts, in particular music and drama.27  The law and literature movement 
famously argued for an analogy between legal interpretation and the interpretation of 
poems, novels, and literary texts.  Sandy, of course, was one of the key figures of the law 
and literature movement during its beginnings in the 1980s, and his 1982 essay, Law as 
Literature, was an important document in the early history of that movement.28  But it is 
characteristic of Sandy’s devotion to intellectual exploration that he moved past that 
early theoretical comparison, and arrived at a much more interesting and complicated 
position.  The proper analogy, he and I have argued, is not law as literature, but law as 
music or drama.  Rather than thinking about what lawyers and judges do through the lens 
of interpretation, like a poem, or a novel, one should think instead of the work of lawyers 
and judges as performances before an audience.  We should regard law as a performing 
art, as something that must be performed in order to be brought into being and have 
effects in the world. 
The analogy of law to literature suggests that the judge’s relationship to the author 
of a legal text is like the reader’s relationship to the author of a literary text; the question 
is what it means to interpret the text correctly, or faithfully, or otherwise appropriately 
given the existing conventions of interpretation.  However, when we think about law in 
terms of performance, it is immediately obvious that the performer has a double 
relationship: to the author or composer of the text, and to the audience or community 
before whom the performance takes place.  There is a duty of fidelity and responsiveness 
both to the author or composer, and to the audience or the community in which one 
performs.  These relationships and responsibilities can push the performer in the same 
direction, or they can tug in different directions, creating important tensions and 
producing important opportunities for interpretive adaptation and creativity. 
The triangle of performance—consisting of author, performer, and audience—puts 
the question of faith in a different light.  Faith is not simply a question of belief in the 
law or the Constitution; it is a duty of fidelity or faithfulness to both the author and the 
audience.  Performers must not betray the text, but they must also not betray their 
audiences.  Fidelity and faith, of course, are interrelated.  Fidelity requires faith in what 
 
 27. Sanford Levinson & J.M. Balkin, Law, Music, and Other Performing Arts, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1597 
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 28. Sanford Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 Tex. L. Rev. 373 (1982). 
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one is faithful to; it is precisely when one loses faith—in a marriage, in a Constitution, in 
a system of law—that one strays from it, trying to obtain something better.  So it is not 
simply that the performer must not betray the text or the audience; the performer must 
also believe in them—believe in their goodness, their openness, their receptivity, their 
adaptability to new situations and new conditions.  The performer must believe that what 
he or she performs can speak to the audience of today and its concerns, and, equally 
important, that the audience—some audience, at any rate—is prepared to listen and 
respond.  Otherwise, there is no point performing a text, or performing it before an 
audience.  Without faith in the text, one is not performing it; one is criticizing it or 
modifying it.  Without faith in the audience, one is not performing before the audience; 
one is berating it or mocking it. 
There is a deep connection, then, between interpretation and faith, and it appears at 
all three points of the triangle of performance.  Recall our earlier discussion: When we 
say we have faith in the Constitution, do we mean only that we have faith in a text, the 
work of the founders and framers of the Constitution?  Or do we mean that we also have 
faith in the American people, the American nation, and their ability to redeem 
themselves from previous inequities and progress toward an ever freer and more just 
social order?  The view that the Constitution is ultimately a comedy, which, as we have 
seen, is also a statement of faith, is a statement of faith not only in the text of the 
Constitution, not only in the work of judges, but also in the Constitution’s “audience,” if 
you will—the American people themselves.  We cannot understand constitutional faith 
without understanding this fact. 
This triangle of performance—between the composer, the performer, and the 
audience or community—is the missing dimension in the standard account of the 
analogy between law and literature.  While it is certainly true that there can be no 
performance without texts to perform, there can also be no performance without 
audiences in front of whom one performs.  Even poetry, after all, can be performed 
before an audience, and the oldest poems—the great oral epics of antiquity—were meant 
to be performed.  Sometimes, indeed, there was no clear author—the epic poem was the 
work of many hands—but there always was an audience to entertain, amuse and instruct, 
an audience before whom the work had to be brought to life. 
The tug on the performer from the text and the audience—or audiences, for there 
may be many different audiences and subaudiences for a particular performance—is the 
creative tension that produces good or bad interpretations of a work.  There is a give and 
take between the performing artist and the composer—between the composer whose 
artistic vision must be respected, whose text the artist must obey, and the artist whose 
imaginative genius must be allowed to express itself.  But there is also a give and take 
between performers and their audiences.  We must also attend to the interplay between 
the audience, the community, the flock, the faithful, on the one hand, and the lawyer, the 
performer, the rhetor, the preacher, on the other.  If we do not attend to this interaction, 
we cannot understand how law changes and develops.  We may think that the creative 
genius of the performer is the engine of change in interpretation, but that is really only 
half the story.  It is the audience or audiences whom the rhetor, performer, lawyer, or 
preacher always confronts.  It is the audience or audiences whom he or she must delight, 
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satisfy, entertain, instruct, edify, move, govern, organize, and inspire; they are the great 
unacknowledged engines of change in interpretation.  The audience is not a passive 
receptacle for the performer’s creative sallies; it is not simply a blank slate sitting in the 
darkness of the theater waiting to be shocked or amused.  Members of the audience may 
have their own opinions about good and bad performance, and they may become their 
own performers, offering their own interpretations of the work that will affect how the 
performer performs.  Performers always demand that audiences pay attention to them 
and to their genius.  But sometimes it is the audience to whom attention must be paid. 
VII. CATHOLICISM AND PROTESTANTISM 
The presence of multiple and contrasting views about interpretation leads 
inevitably to the question of authority—the question of whose interpretations control.  In 
the world of faith, it is captured in the dispute between heterodoxy and orthodoxy.  The 
term “orthodoxy” arose at a particular point in the history of the Christian church to mark 
those beliefs officially adopted by the church—the orthodox, which literally means 
“straight belief”—and to dismiss the wide variety of beliefs that did not so conform—the 
heterodox, which means “other belief.”  But the very attempt to describe one’s beliefs as 
orthodox and one’s opponents as heterodox, and to condemn those different beliefs as 
heresy, recognizes the fact of a plurality of beliefs even as it casts them out.  Every 
religion must face the question of whether there is one true faith, or whether there might 
be multiple, different faiths, each of which could rightfully claim that they were the true 
faith, true belief in God.  The description of one faith as the true faith obliquely admits 
the very thing it wishes to deny—the possibility of several faiths, several paths to God.  
The fact that those with heretical faiths believe cannot be denied; one can only insist that 
they believe wrongly, and that their beliefs will lead them to perdition. 
There is an analogous problem in law: interpretations of the law proliferate over 
time, so one must face the question whether there is one true, correct interpretation of the 
law, or whether there are multiple interpretations of the law, each of which could be true 
or correct, and all of which are law, in some important sense of the word.  The question 
is whether and to what extent law requires a final determination of its meaning by some 
institution that has the final authority to say what the law is, and to declare contrary 
interpretations wrong and actions based on them illegal or, at the very least, not required 
by law. 
This brings us to Sandy’s famous distinction between constitutional catholicism 
and constitutional protestantism.  When Sandy offered this distinction in Constitutional 
Faith, he gave it two different dimensions.  First, Sandy drew a distinction between those 
who believed that in interpreting a text, like the Bible or the Constitution, one must look 
to sola scriptura, to the text alone, and those who believed that one must take into 
account other modalities of interpretation,29 as Philip Bobbitt calls them.  These 
modalities might include (for example) history or consequences.30  Second, Sandy 
 
 29. Levinson, supra n. 3, at 18-22. 
 30. Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Interpretation (Blackwell 1991); Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate: 
Theory of the Constitution (Oxford U. Press 1982).  See J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Constitutional 
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offered a distinction between those who believed that there should be a single, central 
source of authority about the meaning of religion, faith, theology, dogma, law, or the 
Constitution, and those who believed that interpretation should be left up to the 
conscience of the individual believer.31  Under this view, interpretive “catholics” look to 
a central source of interpretive authority—for example, the United States Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of the Constitution, while interpretive “protestants” might 
recognize the authority of the political branches, social movements, and even individual 
citizens to interpret the Constitution.32 
Of the two axes or dimensions of Sandy’s distinction between catholicism and 
protestantism, the second one has proven more fertile in the subsequent literature, while 
the first has largely been forgotten.  There are two reasons for this.  First, the modalities 
and styles of constitutional argument and constitutional interpretation are multiple, not 
unitary.  People do not look only to the text to tell them what the Constitution means, 
they also look to history, to governmental structure, to precedent, to consequences, to 
natural law, and to the ethos of America as a nation.  Second, by contrast, the question 
whether the Supreme Court has the final say in the determination of the Constitution’s 
meaning is an ongoing controversy.  That controversy has been spurred on in recent 
years by the work of the Rehnquist Court, which has taken a decidedly judicial 
supremacist line in promoting its conservative political agenda.  Sandy’s articulation of 
constitutional protestantism has struck a sympathetic chord with constitutional thinkers 
who are critical of judicial supremacy and judicial review, and who seek to discover 
alternative constitutional values in the work of legislatures, executive officials, social 
movements, and ordinary citizens.  Constitutional protestantism, which celebrates 
individual conscience and constitutional values that arise from the bottom up, seems an 
altogether useful corrective to constitutional catholicism, which, in the hands of the 
current Supreme Court, at least, insists on a unitary meaning of the Constitution that 
comes from the top down. 
In Constitutional Faith, Sandy treated catholicism and protestantism as ideal types, 
representing an opposition between individual conscience and institutional authority.  In 
fact, I believe that they form a nested opposition, for in practice each incorporates 
elements of the other and depends on the other.33  This interrelation is hidden when we 
think about the Constitution statically.  It becomes apparent when we view the 
Constitution as a dynamic system.  The views of courts are not fixed; they change over 
time in response to changing political circumstances, and, in particular, to the 
constitutional views of social movements and political parties.  Many changes in 
constitutional doctrine do not occur simply because judges happen to change their minds; 
they occur because people with particular constitutional views organize to promote those 
views and, if successful, eventually influence the sorts of people who are appointed to be 
judges and Justices. 
 
 31. Levinson, supra n. 3, at 23-27. 
 32. Id. at 27-30. 
 33. See J.M. Balkin, Nested Oppositions, 99 Yale L.J. 1669 (1990) (reviewing John M. Ellis, Against 
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Despite the Supreme Court’s pronouncements, we live, as we always have, in a 
world of constitutional dissensus—a world in which lots of people believe that the 
Supreme Court has gotten it wrong, and that their view is the right one.  These people 
gather, and form social movements; they influence political parties or take them over.  
Eventually some of them change the norms of society, and they succeed in appointing 
judges and Justices who interpret the Constitution in new and different ways.  In this 
way, constitutional catholicism, a top-down approach that asserts a single authoritative 
source that determines constitutional meaning, secretly depends on constitutional 
protestantism, a bottom-up approach that emphasizes the wide variety of dissenting 
views about the Constitution held by people who struggle to persuade others about the 
truth of those views.  When we think about the Constitution dynamically, it becomes 
clear that dissensus about constitutional values—the most characteristic feature of 
constitutional protestantism—is the great engine of constitutional change, shaping even 
that most “catholic” of institutions, the United States Supreme Court. 
Conversely, in explaining how the dissenting views of individuals eventually 
succeed in changing constitutional doctrine, we will discover the “catholic” elements in 
constitutional protestantism.  Although constitutional protestantism exalts the individual 
conscience and the individual’s interpretation of the Constitution, constitutional 
protestants succeed in influencing constitutional politics because they attempt to 
persuade others to their views and successfully take over the institutions of interpretive 
authority associated with constitutional catholicism.  The revolution in understandings of 
federal power that we identify with the New Deal were cemented not in 1937, the year of 
the Court’s fabled “switch-in-time,” but in the years immediately after, when President 
Franklin Roosevelt and an overwhelmingly Democratic Senate were able to replace the 
conservative jurists that had hindered his New Deal programs with advocates of 
expanded federal power.  The constitutional dissenters had captured the temple of justice 
and made it their own.  In like fashion, movement conservatives in our own day have 
fought a thirty-year battle to undo the work of the Warren Court and stock the federal 
judiciary with like minded individuals.  As Sandy and I have recounted, they have in 
many respects succeeded, and are now on the verge of major transformations in 
constitutional meaning.34 
Constitutional protestantism celebrates dissent from institutional authority, but it is 
important to recognize that dissenters do more than have beliefs.  They also try to 
convince others that these views are correct.  Their ability to do so depends on their 
organizing themselves into social movements and political parties and pressing their 
claims on judges and government officials, and, if these judges and officials will not 
listen to them, winning elections and replacing those judges and those officials with ones 
more to their liking.  The power of constitutional protestantism, in practice, is exercised 
through the political process, through the party system, and through judicial 
appointments which are controlled by the major political parties.  If one wants one’s 
views of the Constitution to become widespread and accepted, one must organize, one 
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must form political communities of belief, create new doctrines and dogmas, and attempt 
to gain control of the levers of institutional authority, including not only the Congress 
and the presidency, but also the courts.  That, of course, is what successful social 
movements have done throughout American history.  Their views about the Constitution 
won out because they went out into the world searching for converts, persuading, 
displacing, and replacing those with a contrary viewpoint. 
When Sandy offered his original distinction, he did not focus on these institutional 
features of protestantism.  He was more concerned with what I have called the problem 
of idolatry.35  Constitutional protestantism is a rebuke to idolatry.  It insists that each of 
us has the opportunity and the responsibility to decide what the Constitution means, and 
to decide whether public officials—including members of the Supreme Court—have 
been faithful to that meaning.  Constitutional protestantism asserts faith in something 
beyond positive law and the practices of government officials.  It imagines an ideal 
Constitution that has yet to be realized.  Through faith in this Constitution, one avoids 
idolatry, one refuses to bow down to a false image of our higher law.  One may have to 
obey positive law for practical reasons, but one still retains belief in a Constitution—the 
real Constitution—that is not determined by those who control it momentarily. 
This romantic conception of protestantism focuses on individuals, not on 
collectivities, and on the power of individual conscience.  But in practice, in lived 
history, constitutional protestantism is not simply a privilege of conscience.  It is a 
structural feature of the system of constitutional democracy and of constitutional change. 
Constitutional change occurs because people have different views about what the 
Constitution means and they organize in groups to try to convince others that their views 
are correct.  This task of organization and persuasion has an entirely apt analogy in 
religion: it is the work of proselytization and conversion.  Thus, even if constitutional 
protestantism begins with the conscience of the individual believer, it will not long 
remain so.  For the history of protestantism itself is the history not of isolated 
individuals, but of communities of belief, reaching out continuously to convert others 
and bring them to the truth. 
Through political parties and social movement activism, constitutional protestants 
dissatisfied with the pronouncements of the legal equivalent of the Papacy—the Supreme 
Court of the United States—not only can change the public’s views of what the 
Constitution means, they can also change the meaning ascribed by the courts themselves.  
Sometimes their attempts at change are successful, and sometimes they are not.  But the 
engine of Constitutional change is protestantism and proselytization. 
One might object that my redefinition of protestantism as the engine of 
constitutional change obscures the real question: the question of authority.  
Constitutional catholics might concede that constitutional change occurs in much the 
way I have described, and yet insist that this tells us nothing about who possesses legal 
authority to interpret the Constitution.  The work of social movements and political 
parties is interesting from the standpoint of political analysis, but this analysis does not 
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demonstrate that legal authority is vested in those who disagree with the Court.  That 
authority, a constitutional catholic might insist, is vested in the Supreme Court of the 
United States and the lower courts, at least with respect to a very large share of 
constitutional questions that lie outside of the realm of foreign policy.  If Constitutional 
protestantism is not claiming that political actors and social movements have legal 
authority to interpret the Constitution, then it is merely a description of politics.  If it 
does make such a claim of legal authority, it is untenable.  It is one thing to say that the 
National Rifle Association (“NRA”) disagrees with the Court about whether the Second 
Amendment protects an individual’s right to bear arms and that it tries to persuade others 
to its way of thinking and attempts to influence the judicial selection process.  It is quite 
another to say that the NRA has the authority to determine the meaning of the 
Constitution. 
And yet, I think that this objection fails to take seriously the issues at stake.  By 
reducing constitutional protestantism to a normative claim about legal authority, one 
tends to miss the big picture.  That big picture is a story not about what constitutes 
authority at a single moment in time, but how legal authority is produced over time. 
What is important is not whether constitutional protestantism or catholicism is a 
normatively correct statement of authority at a particular point in time, but the dialectic 
between the authoritative pronouncements of courts and the assertions of constitutional 
norms by those outside the courts.  Constitutional protestantism, I would insist, is 
important not as a static claim of legal right, but as a dynamic feature of the 
constitutional system.  The authority with which constitutional protestantism is 
concerned is the democratic authority that eventually turns claims of political principle 
into positive law, the constitutional alchemy that spins the gold of legal norms out of the 
straw of political contestation.  Constitutional change is produced by the very thing that 
constitutional protestantism describes: the fact that people have different beliefs about 
what the Constitution means, the fact that they struggle over those contested meanings, 
and the fact that some of these meanings, and not others, win out, and become enshrined, 
for a time, in the positive law of the American Constitution.  The question of whether 
one believes in constitutional protestantism is like the old joke about baptism: I not only 
believe in it, I’ve seen it done. 
Authority is produced historically.  Law changes, standards of legal judgment 
change, the conditions of constitutional plausibility change.  To understand authority, we 
must understand how authority changes.  To understand how authority changes, we must 
understand the engines of change.  Asking the normative question, “Does the Supreme 
Court have the right, or does an individual have the right to have their view of the 
Constitution be law?” already skews the debate, for it misses the historical and dynamic 
elements in how authority is constructed.  By reducing the debate between constitutional 
catholicism and protestantism to a simple normative question about who has authority, 
one makes it impossible to discuss the mechanisms of constitutional change that produce 
authority. 
We might recast this point in larger jurisprudential terms.  The notion of 
constitutional protestantism is, I would submit, more than a theory of constitutional 
interpretation, or even a theory of constitutional change.  It is also a deeply subversive 
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theory about what “law” is.  Constitutional protestantism offers a theory of what one 
might call, to coin a phrase, the “constitutional demi-monde.”  At any point in time, 
whether or not actually recognized by judges, there is constitutional “law”—the 
quotation marks are completely appropriate here—circulating around the country.  This 
“law” consists of claims about constitutional values and norms, claims such as “Slavery 
is unconstitutional,” said by someone before the Thirteenth Amendment, or “Women 
have the right to vote,” spoken during the 1870s, or, “The Constitution forbids 
segregated public schools,” spoken in 1945, or “‘Don’t Ask Don’t Tell’ is 
unconstitutional,” spoken today.  Such claims about the Constitution do not qualify as 
law in the ordinary sense, because they are not the opinions of those legal officials 
authorized to pronounce what the law is.  But neither are they simply political or policy 
claims.  They are claims of law made about the law, and they are part of the process of 
constitutional lawmaking and law changing.  And the process of making protestant 
constitutional claims—constitutional claims as yet unrecognized by courts—is an 
essential feature of the system of constitutional lawmaking in the United States.  So in 
that respect, it is paradoxically part of official lawmaking, even if not officially 
recognized as such.  That is why I speak of the constitutional demi-monde, because these 
constitutional claims are neither fish nor fowl; they are neither purely political claims nor 
the sort of legal claims recognized by legal authorities.  The practice of constitutional 
claiming, of constitutional norm assertion and formation, is the sort of thing designed to 
give an analytical legal philosopher fits.  And yet, the idea of a constitutional demi-
monde, a veritable sargasso of constitutional claims from which new constitutional 
norms emerge, follows rather easily from the idea of constitutional protestantism, and the 
dialectic between constitutional protestantism and constitutional catholicism that I have 
tried to outline in this essay.  It is a thicker, more interesting, and more puzzling 
conception of law and lawmaking.  It is a theory of law as performance, a theory of law 
as demi-monde, a theory of legal change, and it all flows out of the rich, fertile soil of the 
distinction that Sandy first offered in Constitutional Faith. 
VIII.  HERE ENDETH THE LESSON 
What is faith?  Faith may be faith in a thing outside the self, but inevitably it is also 
faith in one’s self and in one’s relationship to the object of faith.  One may have faith in a 
text, but the contours of that faith are ultimately defined by one’s relation to other human 
beings.  What is idolatry?  Idolatry is faith in what one ought not to have faith in.  But to 
reject idolatry requires faith of a different sort.  For one smashes idols to re-assert faith in 
the true.  Yet if all of the gods are idols, it matters not which one believes in, or whether 
one believes at all. 
Faith in law always risks idolatry, for law is made by fallible human beings.  
Appeal to Divine law does not save us from this problem, for even God’s own laws are 
known only through the arguments and beliefs of mortals.  Christianity, and particularly 
protestant Christianity, famously criticized Judaism and its covenant with God because 
adherence to God’s law is too difficult for sinful human beings to live up to.  The 
problem, however, does not lie simply in our inability to live up to God’s law.  It also 
lies in our inability to know what that law is.  Human representations of God’s will 
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inevitably become corrupted by parochialism, self-interest, and short-sightedness.  In this 
way, righteousness turns into reaction, piousness into hypocrisy.  How much more so is 
this true of law that makes no claims to Divine authority?  And yet, for all that, one still 
must have something in which to believe. 
Lawyers are merchants of faith: they trade on faith, they trade in faith.  Without 
law, they tell us, there can be no justice; with law, justice is at least possible.  Law offers 
us the promise of justice without ever making good on that promise in full.  That is why 
the most basic problem of jurisprudence is the problem of faith in law; and the most 
basic question in jurisprudence is the question to what extent our faith in law is justified.  
At the heart of law, and the philosophy of law, lies the problem of faith and idolatry. 
That is what Sandy Levinson taught me. 
 
